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The current research examined the role of retributive justice and cost-benefit utility
motivations in the process through which mortality salience increases support for violent
responses to intergroup conflict. Specifically, previous research has shown that mortality
salience often encourages political violence, especially when perceptions of retributive
justice are activated. The current research examined whether mortality salience directly
activates a justice mindset over a cost-benefit utility mindset, and whether this justice
mindset is associated with support for political violence. In Study 1 (N = 209), mortality
salience was manipulated among Israeli participants who then read about a Hamas
attack on Israel with either no casualties or many casualties, after which justice and
utility motivations for retribution were assessed. Study 2 (N = 112), examined whether
the link between death primes and support for an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s
nuclear facilities is mediated by justice or cost-benefit utility considerations. Results of
both studies revealed that primes of death increased justice-related motivations, and
these motives, rather than utility motives, were associated with support for violence.
Findings suggest that existential concerns often fuel violent intergroup conflict because
they increase desire for retributive justice, rather than increase belief that violence is
an effective strategy. These findings expand our knowledge on the motivations for
intergroup violence, and shed experimental light on real-life eruptions of violent conflict
indicating that when existential concerns are salient, as they often are during violent
conflict, the decision to engage in violence often disregards the utility of violence, and
leads to the preference for violent solutions to political problems – even when these
solutions make little practical sense.
Keywords: terror management, intergroup conflict, justice beliefs, cost-benefit analysis, support for violence
INTRODUCTION
“My administration has a job to do and we’re going to do it. We will rid the world of the evil-doers.”
President George W. Bush – 9/16/01
“The paradox is that evil comes from man’s urge to heroic victory over evil.”
Becker (1975, p. 136)
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Prominent social thinkers such as Fromm (1941),
Rank (1958), Becker (1975), and Lifton (2003) have all noted
that the pursuit of goodness, justice, and a better world has
been paradoxically responsible for some of humankind’s most
horrendous acts of violence. The stated goal of the Nazi genocide
of European Jews was to promote a superior race of humans,
and to purify the world by eliminating those they viewed
as inferior. Osama Bin Laden described his motivation for
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon as providing retribution for injustices in the Middle
East ostensibly committed by the US. Interviews with rank-
and-ﬁle terrorists reveal that feeling that one’s people have
been unjustly treated is among the most frequently reported
motivators for their attacks (e.g., Stern, 2003; Richardson,
2006).
These observations regarding the paradoxical relationship
between justice and violence are substantiated by research
showing that the belief that violence is a necessary means
to a moral end is powerful enough to trump rational cost
beneﬁt considerations regarding the utility of violence. For
example, research on Americans, Nigerians, and Israeli West-
Bank settlers show that support for military interventions
reﬂects deontological reasoning focused on what is morally
appropriate or just, rather than on what is practically useful
(Ginges and Atran, 2011). Similarly, perceptions of defeat in
a previous violent encounter compared with perceptions of
victory increased support for violent retaliation, even though
defeat suggests that violence is counter-productive (Ein-Dor
and Hirschberger, 2013). The research reported in this paper
assessed the possibility that at least part of the motivation
underlying support for political violence to restore justice is
the protection from existential anxiety that retribution for
perceived injustices provides. Speciﬁcally, we contend that the
link observed in numerous studies between existential concerns
and political violence (seeHirschberger and Pyszczynski, 2011 for
a review) may reﬂect the eﬀects of existential concerns on justice
motivation, and that this justice motivation plays an important
role in promoting intergroup violence. Thus, existential concerns
often increase the motivation to pursue justice, and this need for
justice often leads to violent behavior aimed at vanquishing an
evil enemy.
The Paradox of Justice and Violence
To suggest that intergroup aggression is motivated by justice
concerns may appear counter-intuitive, at ﬁrst sight, because
justice connotes fairness, morality, virtues, and ethics that
should ostensibly promote better intergroup understanding. The
intuitive alternative to our proposal is that conﬂict is actually
driven by naked self-interest that pays no heed to justice
and morality. Although the concrete consequences of speciﬁc
incursions by an adversary surely play a role in promoting
support for violence (Bueno de Mesquita, 1988), we argue that
it is the symbolic implications of these actions that are most
important in motivating people to support war and other forms
of political violence. The ﬂourishing research on justice and
morality suggest a homo moralis model of human motivation
(Skitka, 2009), wherein the need to perceive our behavior within
a moral framework often overcomes economic cost-beneﬁt
considerations.
In the context of intergroup relations, research has demon
strated that aggression rarely, if ever occurs without justiﬁcation,
and that in order to harm another person or group, justifying
mechanisms such as dehumanization, moral disengagement, and
exclusion from the moral community must be activated (Bandura
et al., 2001; Castano and Giner-Sorolla, 2006). We propose that
existential concerns constitute a powerful underlying motivation
for both justice-related and violent motivations, and employ
terror management theory (TMT: Greenberg et al., 1997;
Pyszczynski et al., 2015) as an existential framework that can
illuminate how the desire to promote justice and morality may
paradoxically, and tragically, fan the ﬂames of conﬂict.
Existential Roots of Justice and Violence
Terror management theory posits that people are protected from
the potential for anxiety that results from their awareness of the
inevitability of death by an anxiety buﬀering system consisting
of: (1) their cultural worldviews, which provide an explanation
for existence, standards through which they can attain a sense of
personal value, and the promise of literal or symbolic immortality
to those who live up to these standards, (2) self-esteem, which
is acquired by believing in the cultural worldview and living
up to its standards, (3) and close interpersonal attachments
that validate one’s worldview and self-esteem. Because these
psychological entities play a vital role in protecting people from
deeply rooted fears, much social thought and behavior is oriented
toward maintaining and defending them against threats (For
recent reviews of evidence for the fundamental propositions of
TMT, see Kesebir and Pyszczynski (2012), Greenberg et al. (2014),
or Pyszczynski et al., 2015).
Because consensual validation of worldviews and self-
conceptions is needed for eﬀective protection against anxiety, the
mere existence of those with diﬀerent worldviews is threatening.
Divergent worldviews become even more threatening when
members of other groups threaten one’s collective self-esteem
by proclaiming the superiority of their worldview. Such
proclamations undermine the conviction that one’s group
represents absolute values of truth and goodness, and therefore
increase anger, derogation, and aggression against any source
that contests the moral supremacy of one’s group (Eidelson
and Eidelson, 2003). Research has shown that such reactions to
challenges to one’s group are especially powerful when thoughts
of death are salient (Pyszczynski et al., 2008).
In addition to the threat to collective self-esteem posed by
harm to one’s group and the threat to cultural worldviews posed
by disagreement with core group beliefs and values, a major
consequence of mistreatment by an adversary is that such actions
violate the principles of justice and fairness that provides security
in a dangerous world. As Lerner (1980) pointed out, people are
strongly motivated to view the world as just because this implies
that one can avoid negative outcomes by being a good person.
From a TMT perspective, justice is especially important for
the regulation of existential concerns. Assuming that the world is
just provides order, structure, and emotional security by implying
that behavior is related to outcomes. Self-esteem can provide
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security only if one assumes the world is just – only in a just
world does being a good person guarantee good outcomes. Thus,
assumptions about justice are necessary for self-esteem (whether
individual or collective) to serve its anxiety buﬀering function.
The assumption that the world is just also implies that bad
behavior or aﬀronts to oneself or one’s group must be punished.
The absence of such retribution would imply that either the world
is not just or that one (or one’s group) lacks value and is deserving
of negative treatment.
The motivation to pursue justice, therefore, reﬂects an
existential necessity because construing the world as a just place
in which the good are rewarded and the evil are punished
provides comfort and shields people from the possibility of a
capricious, random universe wherein happenstance rules and
evil may triumph. Indeed, research has shown that mortality
salience increases justice motivations, as evidenced by greater
derogation of victims and preference for stories in which tragedy
leads to positive outcomes (e.g., Landau et al., 2004; Hirschberger,
2006). Moreover, exposure to instances of injustice increases the
accessibility of death related thoughts (Hirschberger, 2006).
The eﬀects of mortality salience on justice strivings may
sometimes have prosocial implications, such as increasing
sensitivity to injustices (Kastenmüller et al., 2013). But more
often than not, the eﬀects of existential concerns on justice
are reﬂected in the desire to rationalize and justify human
suﬀering (Hirschberger, 2015), and more severely punish social
transgressors (Florian and Mikulincer, 1997). Thus, we suggest
that the eﬀects of mortality salience on justice perceptions in the
context of intergroup conﬂict are often driven by the desire to
justify violence – a tendency that is typically seen as violating
norms of justice and morality.
A large body of research indicates that mortality salience
manipulations often increase support for political violence in
response to pressing real world conﬂicts. Speciﬁcally, mortality
salience increased support for American military actions in Iraq
(Landau et al., 2004); led Israelis to support a pre-emptive strike
against Iran and against the Hezbollah in Lebanon (Hirschberger
et al., 2009); led conservative Americans to support extreme
military tactics to ﬁght terrorism (Pyszczynski et al., 2006); led
right-wing Israelis to support violent resistance against policies
that threaten their worldview (Hirschberger and Ein-Dor, 2006);
and led Iranians to increase their support for suicide bombing as
a tactic to ﬁght American imperialism (Pyszczynski et al., 2006).
TMT researchers have interpreted these ﬁndings as suggesting
that existential threat increases the tendency to construe violence
as a justiﬁable and heroic response to an evil adversary (e.g.,
Pyszczynski et al., 2006).
In fact, many of the conditions under which MS increases
support for political violence involve construing violence as
moral, just and as reﬂecting the values of one’s worldview. In some
studies, this was an explicit induction, as when Israelis read a
report of a speech from Iranian leaders calling for the destruction
of Israel (Hirschberger et al., 2009); such proclamations are likely
to be perceived as justifying military aggression, and, indeed,
MS increased support for a preemptive strike against Iran when
participants were exposed to such rhetoric, but not when they
were exposed to more conciliatory remarks. In assessments of the
psychological processes involved in Americans’ reactions to the
9/11 terrorist attacks (e.g., Landau et al., 2004; Pyszczynski et al.,
2006), participants reminded of these attacks were likely to view
violence as justiﬁed even in the absence of direct manipulations
of such construals. Approximately two months following the
attacks, Kaiser et al. (2004) found that the more participants
endorsed just world beliefs before the attacks, the more they
desired revenge.
The Present Research
Although these ﬁndings can be interpreted as indicating an
increased desire to vanquish an evil enemy and restore justice
(Pyszczynski et al., 2006), the role of justice concerns in these
eﬀects has only recently been directly assessed. In research
conducted on Israeli Jews, Arabs, and South Koreans, primes
that emphasized the importance of justice increased support
for political violence when mortality was salient, even when
the practical utility of violence was explicitly stated to be low
(Hirschberger et al., in press). Speciﬁcally, this research showed
that Palestinian citizens of Israel who were guided to think
about the justice of the Palestinian side in the conﬂict with
Israel responded to MS with greater support for violence against
Israel. When asked to think about the possible costs and beneﬁts
of escalating the conﬂict with Israel, however, MS had the
opposite eﬀect and reduced support for violence. Similarly, South
Koreans and Israeli Jews who were exposed to descriptions
of violent attacks against their people (high justice condition)
responded to MS with increased support for retaliation even if
they were exposed to military experts suggesting that a counter-
attack would have no expected utility (low utility condition).
These studies demonstrated the interaction between existential
concerns and justice and utility considerations, but they did not
address a more fundamental question – do existential concerns
actively increase the appeal of justice considerations over cost-
beneﬁt utility ones?
The current research builds on previous ﬁndings showing
that deontological reasoning takes precedence over utilitarian
reasoning (Ginges and Atran, 2011), especially when death is
salient (Hirschberger et al., in press). But the present studies go
beyond previous ﬁndings to test the hypothesis that retributive
justice motivation is increased by mortality salience, and that
the link between such threat and the desire to aggress against an
adversary is driven by retributive justice rather than cost-beneﬁt
utility concerns.
STUDY 1
Study 1 examined whether MS makes participants more
supportive of arguments for political violence based on the
rhetoric of justice over arguments based on the cost-beneﬁt utility
of violence. To better understand the eﬀects of MS on retributive
justice, we also examined whether MS increases support for
violence primarily when the instigation to restore justice is
strong. Darley and Pittman’s (2003) analysis of retributive justice
posits that the greater the harm the other party inﬂicts, the greater
the desire for retaliation. Conversely, when little harm has been
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done, the motivation for retribution is likely to be low. If MS
increased support for retributive attacks primarily in response
to severe incursions by an enemy when the desire for justice
is therefore high, it would provide support for our claim that
concerns for justice play an important role in the relationship
between existential threat and support for political violence. We,
therefore, created two conditions, one in which retaliation was
highly justiﬁed by the severe consequences of an attack, and
another in which it would be diﬃcult to justify a violent reprisal
because the consequences of the instigating attack were minimal.
Participants were primed with either MS or an aversive control
topic before responding to these scenarios.
To address these issues within the context of the Israeli–
Palestinian conﬂict, we constructed a measure of justice and
utility motivations for violence (the justice-utility scale, JUS)
that provides distinct assessments of justice and utilitarian
motivations for violence, Study 1 was designed to determine
whether MS increases support for justice, utility, or both
motivations, and whether the eﬀect of MS emerges primarily in
response to severe provocations, when the desire for justice is
likely to be greater. Thus, in the current study participants read
one of two scenarios about a missile attack on the town of Sderot
(which is located only one mile from the city of Gaza); half of
the participants were randomly assigned to a scenario depicting a
severe outcome of the missile attack with many Israeli casualties,
and the other half to a scenario depicting a mild outcome with no
casualties.
Method
Participants
Two hundred and nine undergraduate students, 57 men and 151
women (one participant did not report gender), ranging in age
from 19 to 55 (Median = 24, SD = 4.2), participated in the
study for course credit. The sample size was determined by a
power analysis (Faul et al., 2007) to allow 80% power for detecting
weak-sized within-between interaction (the main analysis in the
current study; 1% explained variance). The analysis indicated
that we need at least 198 participants. The observed power in
Study 1 (with 209 participants) is, therefore, 82.44%. Both studies
reported here were approved by the institutional review board
(IRB) of the IDC.
Materials and Procedure
Experimental sessions were run in groups of 10–15 people
with participants randomly assigned to experimental conditions
within each session. Participants were ﬁrst randomly assigned to
either the mortality salience or pain salience conditions. In the
mortality salience condition, participants answered the following
open-ended questions: “What do you think happens to you as
you physically die and once you are physically dead?” and “Please
brieﬂy describe the emotions that the thought of your own
death arouses in you.” In the pain salience condition, participants
received the same open-ended questions with references to death
replaced with “severe physical pain.” Research has repeatedly
shown the eﬀectiveness of this procedure to increase thoughts
of death (e.g., Pyszczynski et al., 2006). Then, all participants
completed a word search puzzle that served as a distraction.
Following this procedure, all participants read a description of
a missile attack from the Gaza Strip on the Israeli town of Sderot.
In half the cases, the attack was described as a lethal attack with
many casualties. In the other half, the attack was described asmild
with damage to buildings but no human casualties.
Following these scenarios, participants completed the JUS,
a 26-item measure answered on 7-point scales ranging from
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The JUS includes 10
retributive justice items (e.g., “Amilitary strike on Gaza will make
the Palestinians pay for their crimes”; “We should attack Gaza
because what they are doing to us is unjust”; “attacking Gaza will
do justice for Israelis who were killed by Hamas”; “it would be
completely unjust to attack the Gaza strip (R)”; “An attack on
Gaza would avenge the death of Israelis”), six utility items (e.g.,
“A military strike on Gaza will eﬀectively reduce missile attacks
against Sderot”; “An attack on Gaza will restore our deterrence”;
“An attack on Gaza will weaken Hamas”; “An attack on Gaza will
serve no purpose (R)”; “Killing the leaders of Hamas will deliver
a powerful warning to Israel’s enemies”), and 10 ﬁller items (e.g.,
“The government should subsidize public transportation”; “I care
about the environment”; “the interest rate is too high”; “the
government’s health care plan should be expanded”; “there should
be government control over the supreme court”). To examine
the construct validity of the JUS, we administered the scale to
an independent sample of 205 undergraduate participants (48
men, 154 women; 3 participants did not report gender) who
completed the scale for course credit. A maximum likelihood-
based factor analysis with Oblimin rotation conducted on the JUS
revealed intact structural validity and supported the two-factor
solution, with the justice factor explaining 35.4% of the variance
(M = 4.06, SD = 1.65; with factor loading ranging from 0.99
to 0.63) and the utility factor adding 17.95% to the explained
variance (M = 4.96, SD = 1.24; with factor loading ranging from
0.86 to 0.62). Cronbach’s alphas were adequate (0.94 and 0.74 for
the justice and utility subscales, respectively), and scores were
computed for each participant by averaging the relevant items.
Next, participants answered a demographic questionnaire and
were debriefed.
Results and Discussion
To examine the eﬀects of mortality salience (death, pain) and
threat severity (severe, mild) on the two JUS factors (justice,
utility), we conducted a mixed-designed analysis of variance, in
which the between-subject independent factors were mortality
salience and threat severity, and the within-subject independent
factor was the JUS dimension (justice and utility). Preliminary
Pearson correlation analyses indicated that political orientation
was associated with the JUS factors such that right-wing
views were associated with greater support for justice-motivated
retributions, r(207) = 0.36, p< 0.001, and less support for utility-
motivated retributions, r(207) = –0.14, p = 0.047. We, therefore,
added political orientation as a covariate to adjust the analysis for
its contribution (the pattern of results remain the same when not
controlling for political orientation; the slopes were homogenous,
F(2,199) = 0.49, p = 0.62 for justice-motivated retributions, and
F(2,199) = 1.86, p = 0.16 for utility-motivated retributions, and
thus the basic assumptions of ANCOVA were met).
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FIGURE 1 | Mortality salience increases support for violent retaliations for justice- and not utility-related reasons when justification for a retaliation is
high.
The analysis revealed the expected 3-way interaction
between mortality salience, threat severity and type of JUS
dimension, F(1,200) = 4.73, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.02. Simple
eﬀects test with Šidák (1967) adjustment indicated that the
simple 2-way interaction between mortality salience and threat
severity was signiﬁcant for justice-motivated retributions,
F(1,200) = 9.38, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.05, but not for utility-
motivated retributions, F(1,200) = 0.15, p = 0.70, η2p = 0.00.
In line with predictions, mortality salience increased support
for justice-motivated retributions when the threat was severe
(p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.67), but not when the threat
was mild (p = 0.47, Cohen’s d = –0.07). Results are summarized
in Figure 1.
These ﬁndings support our hypothesis that MS increases
support for justice but not utility-based motivations for violence.
Speciﬁcally, MS increased the belief that retributions against
Hamas would restore justice, but did not increase the belief
that such attacks would be pragmatically useful in reducing
future attacks. As predicted, this ﬁnding emerged only when the
initial attack on Israel produced severe outcomes that presumably
created a strong desire for retribution. This provides further
evidence for the role that justice concerns play in the link
betweenMS and support for political violence. It appears that MS
increases support for violent retribution only when there is strong
provocation that leads violent retribution to be viewed as just,
when people are perhaps experiencing what Darley and Pittman
(2003) referred to as “moral outrage.” Indeed, all previous studies
showing that MS increased support for political violence were
conducted within the context of long-standing political conﬂicts
in which there were many instances of egregious actions on the
part of the adversary that likely led participants to believe that
violence was a just response. The present ﬁndings document the
role of perceived justiﬁcation is these types of eﬀects; they also
suggest, however, that when the outcome of an adversary’s attack
is relatively inconsequential, cooler heads seem to prevail.
STUDY 2
Study 1 demonstrated thatMS increases the motivation to restore
justice, but does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence utility-based motives
for violence; this occurred only when the transgression leading up
to the decision regarding a retaliative attack produced relatively
severe consequences. This is consistent with Darley and Pittman’s
(2003) proposition that the motivation to retaliate is directly
proportional to the harm brought on by the instigating event.
These ﬁndings also suggest that an increased desire for justice
may mediate the oft-found eﬀect of MS on support for political
violence against an adversary.
In Study 2, we went a step further and examined whether
there is a causal chain wherein MS increases justice-related
cognitions in general, rather than those speciﬁcally focused on
the conﬂict at hand, which then increase support for violent
solutions to conﬂict. We also wished to extend our conclusions
beyond Israel’s conﬂict with the Palestinians. Thus, in Study
2, our dependent measure was focused on Israeli participants’
support for a preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Many
Israelis view Iran as the most imminent threat to their existence
(Ben Meir and Shaked, 2007), but opinion polls indicate that
they feel ambivalent about initiating a military campaign against
Iran (Telhemi, 2012). Based on our previous research, which
suggests that MS does not induce violent reactions against Iran
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when violence is perceived as avoidable or costly (Hirschberger
et al., 2009), we predicted that the eﬀects of MS on support for a
preemptive strike on Iran would lead to some ambivalence and
hesitation. Thus, we hypothesized that MS would induce support
for preemptive violence only when thinking in justice-related
terms, and that in other cases there will either be no signiﬁcant
association between MS and support for preemptive violence, or
MSmay even reduce the proclivity for violence. Addressing these
eﬀects within the context of the debate regarding the possibility of
Iran developing a nuclear weapon seems especially telling because
discussion of military action to prevent this from occurring
is typically focused on the utility rather than justice of such
actions.
Method
Participants
Israeli undergraduate students (N = 112), 25 men and 87 women,
aged 20 to 36 (Median = 23, SD = 2.2), participated in the
study for course credit. Participants were recruited through the
psychology subject pool at the IDC and were directed to the
Qualtrics system on which the experiment was conducted. The
sample size was determined by Fritz and MacKinnon’s (2007)
power analysis simulation to allow 80% power for detecting
moderated-sized mediation paths (the main analysis in the
current study). The simulation indicated that we need at least
115 participants. We fell slightly short of this recommendation
because data collection terminated at the end of the semester.
Materials and Procedure
Participants registered for a Qualtrics-based online experiment.
Following a consent form, participants completed a ﬁller
personality inventory, were randomly assigned to either the MS
or control condition as in Study 1, and answered 10 questions
about their daily habits that were included as a delay and
distraction.
Next, participants completed a 9-item questionnaire that
assessed their general tendency to seek justice, independent of
the speciﬁc context (four items; “When somebody hurts you,
you want to get back at them”; “You should ﬁght for a just
cause, even if other people ﬁnd it pointless”; “Your feeling of
justice is very important to you”; “You don’t insist on being
right if there is no point in it (R)”; α = 0.74) and cost-
beneﬁt utility (ﬁve items; “You do things to achieve a speciﬁc
goal, and not because it’s the right thing to do”; “During an
argument you try to be rational and practical”; “Your friends
know that you would never get into an argument that you
couldn’t gain something from”; “You are willing to incur losses
for the sake of being right (R)”; “You conduct yourself by
reason, and not by what feels right”; α = 0.60). Participants
rated the extent to which each item described their attitudes
on 7-point scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly
agree (7). A maximum likelihood-based factor analysis with
Oblimin rotation revealed adequate structural validity supporting
the 2-factor solution, with the justice factor explaining 26.62%
of the variance (with factor loading ranging from 0.92 to
0.48) and the utility factor adding 19.92% to the explained
variance (with factor loading ranging from 0.55 to 0.36). For
each participant, we calculated the tendency to seek justice
and to seek cost-beneﬁt utility by averaging the items of each
subscale.
Then, participants completed the aggression toward Iran scale
(Hirschberger et al., 2009), an 11-item measure answered on
7-point scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly
agree (7), assessing support for a military strike on Iran [e.g.,
“The IDF should strike Iran’s nuclear facilities”; “Israel should
launch a preemptive nuclear attack against Iran”; “The only
solution to the crisis with Iran is a diplomatic solution”(R)]. We
computed a total score by averaging the responses to all items
(M= 4.3, SD= 0.88, α= 0.75). After responding to this measure,
participants answered a demographic questionnaire and were
debriefed.
Results and Discussion
To examine whether MS increased participants’ tendency to seek
justice, but not cost-beneﬁt utility, we conducted a mixed-design
analysis of variance, in which the between-subject independent
factors was MS, and the within-subject independent factor was
general attitudes about justice and utility. The analysis revealed
the expected 2-way interaction between MS and justice/utility,
F(1,109) = 4.30, p= 0.04, η2p = 0.04. Simple eﬀects tests with Šidák
(1967) adjustment indicated that, in line with predictions, MS
signiﬁcantly increased participants’ tendency to think in
justice-related terms (M = 4.91, SD = 1.02 for the mortality
salience condition; M = 4.49, SD = 1.16 for the control
condition; p = 0.042, Cohen’s d = 0.38), but did not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect utility considerations (M = 4.36, SD = 0.93 for the
mortality salience condition; M = 4.47, SD = 0.89 for
the control condition; p = 0.54, Cohen’s d = –0.12). We
also examined whether there is a direct eﬀect of MS on
support for an attack on Iran. An independent samples
t-test revealed that MS did not directly aﬀect support
for an attack on Iran t(109) = 0.86, p = 0.39, Cohen’s
d = 0.16.
To establish an indirect link from MS through the tendency
to seek justice and/or utility to support for an attack on
Iran, we followed three steps based on Preacher and Hayes’
(2008) procedure. First, we examined whether MS inﬂuenced
participants’ tendency to seek justice and/or cost-beneﬁt utility.
Next, we examined whether participants’ seeking of justice
and/or cost-beneﬁt utility signiﬁcantly predicted their level of
support for an attack on Iran after controlling for MS. Finally,
using accelerated bias-corrected bootstrap analysis, we examined
whether the indirect path from MS through the pursuit of justice
and/or cost-beneﬁt utility to support for an attack on Iran was
signiﬁcant. As in Study 1, we added political orientation as a
covariate to adjust the analysis for its contribution [the pattern
of results remains the same when not controlling for political
orientation; homogeneity of slopes was met as indicated by the
non-signiﬁcant interactions between political orientation and
mediation paths (all ps > 0.25)].
The analysis revealed a greater tendency to seek justice
(b = 0.37, p = 0.047; note that b refers to unstandardized slopes
because standardized slopes are not available in mediation-based
analyses) after MS (compared with the control condition), but
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FIGURE 2 | The effect of mortality salience on support for a preemptive
strike on Iran is mediated through justice motivations, but not through
cost-benefit utility considerations (coefficients are unstandardized).
Continuous lines represent significant prediction paths, whereas dashed lines
represent non-significant paths.∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
not a greater tendency to seek cost-beneﬁt utility (b = –0.13,
p = 0.51). The analysis also revealed that controlling for MS, a
greater tendency to seek justice (b = 0.34, p < 0.001) but not
a tendency to seek cost-beneﬁt utility (b = –0.05, p = 0.61),
was related to greater support for an attack on Iran. An
accelerated bias-corrected bootstrap analysis revealed that the
indirect mediating path betweenMS and support for an attack on
Iran via the tendency to seek justice was signiﬁcant (95% CI: 0.02,
0.31; thus, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from a state of no association),
whereas the mediating path via the tendency to seek cost-beneﬁt
utility was not signiﬁcant (95% CI: –0.02, 0.11). The direct link
between MS and support for an attack on Iran, however, was not
signiﬁcant (b = –0.18, p = 0.39, when not controlling for justice
and utility, and b = –0.34, p = 0.10, after controlling for these
measures). The model accounted for 25.64% of the variance in
support for an attack on Iran (see Figure 2).
The ﬁndings of Study 2 add to Study 1 by showing that MS
induces a general justice mindset but not a utility mindset, and
that this justice mindset indirectly increases support for military
action. One may wonder why MS did not directly increase
support for violence in Study 2. First, in this study, unlike Study 1,
participants were asked to support preemptive violence against a
formidable foe that many Israelis are reluctant to support military
action against, because of the possible devastating consequences
(Telhemi, 2012; Ein-Dor and Hirschberger, 2013). Previous
research has indicated that when violence is seen as avoidable
and when the threat of counter-retaliation is high, MS reduces
support for violence (Hirschberger et al., 2009). In the current
research there was, indeed, a non-signiﬁcant trend toward less
support for violence in the MS condition. Thus, it seems that MS
induced an ambivalent attitude toward violence in this study that
is consistent with our previous research on support for violence
against Iran (Hirschberger et al., 2009; Ein-Dor andHirschberger,
2013). Although MS increases the need to uphold the cultural
worldview, it also induces a reluctance to act violently for self-
protective reasons. The ambivalent eﬀect of MS on violence
against a formidable foe (Iran) seems to have suppressed any
direct inﬂuence of MS on support for violence. When adding
justice into the equation, however, an indirect path from MS to
justice motivations to support of violence is revealed, providing
further support to the main premises of this research that the link
between existential threats and justice motivations may promote
violence.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The ﬁndings of the two studies reported here converge in showing
that existential threat plays an important role in motivating
justice-oriented thinking and support for aggressive policies: In
Study 1, MS increased the appeal of justice- but not utility-
oriented arguments for violent reprisals, and in Study 2, MS
increased more general justice, but not utility-related mindsets,
which was associated with increased support of military action.
Together, these ﬁndings suggest that when thinking about
possible violent solutions to intergroup conﬂicts, and when
existential threat is salient, as often is the case in violent
conﬂict, people typically rely on justice-based or deontological
reasoning, in which considerations of right, wrong, and social
identity trump rational cost-beneﬁt analyses. Previous research
has already demonstrated that existential concerns often underlie
violent intergroup conﬂict (see Hirschberger and Pyszczynski,
2011 for a review), and that activating concerns over morality
and retributive justice override cost-beneﬁt considerations in
the context of intergroup conﬂicts (Ginges and Atran, 2011;
Hirschberger et al., in press). These experimental ﬁndings are in
agreement with a historical analysis of armed conﬂicts in the past
two centuries that concluded that justice motivations were the
main impetus for war, and carried more weight in the decision
to engage in violence, than rational concerns over security
or tangible resources (Welch, 1993). The current research ties
together these disparate literatures and indicates that existential
concerns play an important role in the propensity to engage in
political violence, by increasing concerns regarding justice over
the rational cost-beneﬁt utility of such actions.
The appeal of justice over utility considerations for violence
may seem to suggest that MS induces an irrational aggressiveness
toward adversaries. The results of Study 1, however, indicate that
such a conclusion would be an overstatement of the eﬀect. Study
1 clearly demonstrates that MS induces violence only when the
provocation is severe enough to justify retaliation, but when the
initial provocation is inconsequential there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect
for MS. Thus, retaliation following MS is not automatic and is
dependent on the perception that an attack against one’s group
bears severe consequences that call for retribution. Once it has
been established that an attack was severe, the motivation for
retaliation is based on a desire to deliver justice, and not on the
likelihood that retaliation would reduce the risk of future attacks.
These ﬁndings suggest that the process from existential threat to
support for violent solutions to conﬂict involves both reason and
passion such that only severe enough threats prompt retaliation,
but once the desire for retaliation is activated it is no longer
sensitive to practical considerations.
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The research presented here echoes Becker’s (1975, p. 140)
view that “man cannot feel right unless he lives the heroic victory
over evil, the assurance of immortality.” Fighting for justice and
vanquishing evil amplify the moral diﬀerences between us and
them and bolsters the belief that conﬂict with another group is
not just a selﬁsh quarrel over material resources, but rather, an
epic battle of good versus evil. In this state of mind, it is no
wonder that practical considerations of costs and beneﬁts carry
little weight. These conclusions extend beyond TMT, and are
in keeping with a variety of perspectives on political violence
and existential threats, morality, deontological reasoning, and
defensive reactions (e.g., McGregor et al., 2007; Ginges andAtran,
2011; Haidt, 2012).
The ﬁndings of the current research suggest that the rhetoric
of in-group moral justiﬁcation is a catalyst of intergroup violence,
especially when existential threats are salient, as they often are
in protracted violent conﬂicts. Absolutist conceptions of justice
can be viewed as antithetical to peace because peace requires
recognition of the claims of the other side, realistic assessment
of possibilities, and acceptance of painful compromises that often
involve relinquishing desires for vengeful justice. When people
hold strong convictions about the justice of their group’s position,
they perceive the conﬂict in zero-sum terms, are less likely to
support compromise with adversaries, and are more likely to
believe that violence is inevitable (Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2010).
It is important to emphasize that in this research we used a
concrete economic deﬁnition of utility: the weighing of tangible
beneﬁts against the costs involved. Utility, however, can also
be construed more broadly and abstractly. Recent evolutionary
thinking suggests that violent retributions and concerns for
justice may have served important pragmatic adaptive functions
during evolutionary history (e.g., McCullough, 2008), such as
deterring potential aggressors by sending a clear message that acts
of aggression are not worth the risk. It is quite possible that the
selective advantage of justice-related thinking over evolutionary
history makes such responses attractive, even when they do not
seem to have clear concrete beneﬁts in a speciﬁc instance.
One should also note that Studies 1 and 2 diﬀer in
the conditions motivating violence. Whereas in Study 1 the
motivation for violence is clear retribution that follows lex
talionis – an eye for an eye, in Study 2 the term retribution
may not accurately capture the motivation underlying support
for violence. Rather, it is preemption of the possibility of violence
from a dangerous adversary that is the instigator of aggression.
These diﬀerences may explain the hesitation to support an attack
on Iran in Study 1, compared with the lack thereof in Study 2.
It is also important to note that this research was conducted on
a speciﬁc cultural, religious, and age group, young Israeli Jews,
and in the context of an ongoing protracted conﬂict with the
Palestinians, and on a potentially disastrous conﬂict with Iran.
Although the psychological processes underlying intergroup
conﬂicts share many similarities (Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2010),
future research is needed to establish that the ﬁndings of the
current research pertain to other conﬂicts as well. Of particular
interest is whether justice motivations serve as a catalyst for
violence in other conﬂicts and other regions. This research
contributes to a growing understanding that support for violence
in intergroup conﬂicts is indeed rooted in the implications of
such action for one’s sense of meaning and justice than in
the utility of such actions for one’s improving one’s concrete
circumstances.
This research indicates that when existential issues are at stake
there is danger that conﬂict will stray from a normative, rational
process wherein costs and beneﬁts are carefully considered, and
will revert to an epic battle of good over evil that often deﬁes
logic and places the lives of millions at peril, even when the
chances of success are low. The results of the current research
shed experimental light on real-life eruptions of violent conﬂict
and provide a new avenue for understanding the processes that
lead to the preference for violent solutions to political problems –
even when these solutions make little practical sense.
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